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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over all cases transferred from 
the Utah Supreme Court to the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(j), Utah Constitution art. VII, § 5, and Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure 3. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Pursuant to Utah R. App. P. Rule 24(1) the State is satisfied with the 
Appellant's statement of issues. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES. AND RULES 
The following constitutional provisions, statutes and rules pertain and 
appear in full text in the addendum: 
U.S. CONST., amend. VIII. 
UTAH CONST., art. I, § 9. 
UTAH CONST., art. VII, § 5. 
UtahR. App. P. 3. 
Utah R. App. P. 4. 
Utah R.Civ.P. 60(b). 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-13(2). 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-13(9). 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND RELEVANT FACTS 
1. On or about May 14, 1997, the defendant property, consisting of 
Appellant's home and real estate located at 736 North Colorado Street, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, was seized incident to the execution of search and seizure warrants, 
incident to the discovery of a clandestine methamphetamine laboratory located on 
and in the home and property. The search and seizure warrant was issued by the 
Third District Court, Judge Michael Hutchings. 
2. Based upon a belief by the DE A/Metro Narcotics Task Force and by 
the Salt Lake County District Attorney's Office that the defendant property was 
forfeitable, a Verified Complaint for Forfeiture was filed by the State, pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. §58-37-13 (Supp. 1996) against the seized home and real 
property on May 30, 1997. (Record, [hereafter "R."] 1). 
3. On or about May 30, 1997, a copy of the Verified Complaint for 
Forfeiture in this matter, along with a Notice of Seizure/Notice of Intent to Forfeit 
was mailed, pursuant to statute, to all persons who appeared to be interested 
parties, at their respective last known addresses. This included Beehive Bail 
Bonds at 268 East 500 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, and Appellant at 736 North 
Colorado Street, Salt Lake City, Utah. (R. 25). 
4. Knowing that Appellant's mail was being forwarded, the United 
States Postal Service changed the mailing address of the certified mail for the 
Appellant to 626 North Colorado Street, Salt Lake City, Utah. (R. 25). 
5. Appellant acknowledges that he was living at 626 North Colorado 
Street, Salt Lake City, Utah from February 8, 1997 through June 23, 1997. 
6. The certified mail sent to the Appellant's correct and actual address 
of 626 North Colorado Street was returned after the United States Postal Service 
left notice of the certified mail on three separate occasions. (R. 25). 
7. An application for the entry of the default of the non-answering 
Appellant and Beehive Bail Bonds was thereafter submitted to the Court, and the 
respective defaults of each of the potential interested parties was entered by the 
Court on August 11, 1997. (R. 15-16). Thereafter, Judgment of Forfeiture was 
entered against all potential interested parties, including Appellant, on August 11, 
1997. (R. 11-12). 
8. No claim to the seized property, nor any Answer, was ever filed with 
the Court in the forfeiture proceeding by, or on behalf of Appellant. 
9. On November 4, 1997, a Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment was 
filed by Mark T. Ethington on behalf of the Appellant. (R. 20). A memorandum 
in support thereof was never submitted, nor was any request for decision advanced 
by Mr. Ethington on Appellant's behalf. (R. 20). 
10. On November 12, 1999, Mr. Wall entered his formal appearance 
herein, and filed a memorandum in support of the November 4, 1997 Motion to 
Set Aside Default Judgment. (R. 26). 
11. On December 2, 1999, the State filed a Memorandum in Opposition 
to Motion to Vacate Judgment by Default. (R. 45). 
12. On December 27, 1999, the Third District Court, Judge Stephen L. 
Henriod, presiding, issued a minute entry in which the Court denied Appellant's 
Motion to Vacate Default Judgment. (R. 54). 
13. On January 5, 2000, the State submitted proposed Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, as well as a proposed Order denying the Motion to 
Vacate the Default Judgment. (R. 56). 
14. On January 11, 2000, the Court, Judge Henriod presiding, adopted as 
its own, signed and entered the proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law. (R. 56). 
15. On January 11, 2000, the Court, Judge Henriod presiding, adopted as 
its own, signed and entered the proposed Order Denying Claimant's Motion To 
Set Aside Default Judgment. (R. 63). 
16. On January 13, 2000, a Motion for Reconsideration or in the 
Alternative to Make Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law with an 
accompanying memorandum was filed by Appellant. (R. 66). 
17. On February 3, 2000, the State filed a Memorandum in Opposition 
to Appellant's Motion for Reconsideration. (R. 72). 
18. On February 18, 2000, Appellant filed a "Response to Plaintiffs 
Memorandum in Opposition to Bruce Peterson's Motion for Reconsideration". 
(R. 79). 
19. On March 8, 2000, the Court issued a Minute Entry, summarily 
denying Appellant's Motion for Reconsideration or in the Alternative to Make 
Alternative Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law and Request for Hearing, 
without any finding. (R. 93). 
20. On August 21, 2000, the Court entered its Order Denying Bruce 
Peterson's Motion For Reconsideration. (R. 95). 
21. On August 31, 2000, the parties hereto entered into a Stipulation, in 
which the State agreed that the time for filing an appeal from the Court's January 
11, 2000 Order Denying Bruce Peterson's Motion To Set Aside Default Judgment 
would commence on August 31, 2000, the date of the entry of the Court's Order 
Denying Bruce Peterson's Motion for Reconsideration. (R. 98). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court should reject Appellant's challenge because he impermissibly 
attempts to bootstrap an attack on the underlying Judgment onto his appeal from 
the Court's Order denying his motion to set aside that Judgment. Appellant failed 
to timely appeal from the actual Judgment in the period required by Rule 4 of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure on all issues. Therefore, his appeal is limited 
to whether or not the trial court abused its discretion in denying the Appellant's 
motion to set aside the Judgment. 
Further, this Court should affirm the trial court's Order Denying Claimant's 
Motion To Set Aside Default Judgment. Appellant has failed to show the State's 
non-compliance with the service of process statute. In addition, Appellant failed 
to comply with the requirements necessary to make out a successful challenge to a 
default judgment. Therefore, the relief sought by the Appellant should be denied. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE STATE COMPLIED WITH THE NOTICE 
REQUIREMENTS OF THE FORFEITURE STATUTE. 
A: Appellant's Motion to Vacate Judgment Was Defective. 
Appellant filed his Motion to Vacate Judgment, apparently pursuant to 
Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b), alleging that he should be granted relief from the effects of 
the default judgment herein, because of "mistake, inadvertence, surprise or 
excusable neglect." However, Appellant failed to enunciate or prove any fact or 
circumstance giving him a legitimate claim to the seized and forfeited property. 
In order to be relieved from a default judgment, the movant must not only 
show that the judgment was entered against him through any reason specified in 
Rule 60(b), but he must also show that his motion to set aside the judgment was 
timely, and that he has a meritorious defense to the action. State ex rel Utah State 
Dep't. of Social Services v. Musselman, 667 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1983). 
B: Notice Was Properly Given 
Appellant claims that somehow service was improper as to him, and thus, 
he is entitled to attack the entry of his default. This argument is without merit on 
two fronts. First, the controlled substance asset forfeiture statute specifically 
controls the method of giving notice to possible interested parties, excluding any 
applicability of Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and provides: 
Notice of the seizure and intended forfeiture shall be filed with the 
clerk of the court, and served upon all persons known to the county 
attorney or district attorney to have a claim in the property by: . . . 
(ii) certified mail to each claimant whose name and address is known 
or to each owner whose right, title and interest is of record in the 
Division of Motor Vehicles to the address given upon the records of 
the division, which service is considered complete even though the 
mail is refused or cannot be forwarded. 
Utah Code Ann. §58-37-13(9)(d) [emphasis added]. 
Here, the required Notice was mailed, via certified mail, to Appellant's last 
known address, and was forwarded to, and attempted to be delivered at, 626 North 
Colorado Street, the address which he, in fact, admits was his residence from 
February 8, 1997 through June 23, 1997. The fact that Appellant ignored delivery 
attempts made by the United States Postal Service for mail sent to the very address 
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where he admits he was living and having mail delivered is not "mistake, surprise 
or excusable neglect" sufficient to warrant the vacating of this Court's validly 
entered judgment. 
Secondly, the statute specifically states that service is considered complete 
even though the mail [sent via certified mail pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §58-37-
13(9)(d)] is refused or cannot be forwarded. Here, Appellant was dilatory and 
was voluntarily avoiding Notice as provided by statute by ignoring the three 
attempts at delivery made by the Postal service to the very address where he 
admits he was residing. The State's compliance with the statutory scheme of 
Notice in forfeiture cases rendered "service . . . complete even though the mail 
[was] refused or cannot be forwarded". Utah Code Ann. §58-37-13(9)(d) (1953, 
as amended). 
Lastly, Appellant misapprehends the meaning of Utah Code Ann. §58-37-
13(9)(d)(i), which provides for personal service upon a claimant which is charged 
in a criminal information or indictment. In 1996, in response to a Utah Court of 
Appeals decision regarding forfeiture and double jeopardy, the Utah Legislature 
amended the forfeiture statute to create, at §§ 58-37-13(9)(a) through 13(9)(b), a 
mechanism, previously unknown in Utah law, whereby the forfeiture of property 
and assets could be combined and proceed with a criminal information or 
indictment brought by the State against the property owner. In these cases, where 
the State criminal charge against the property owner contains a demand for 
forfeiture, §58-37-13(9)(d) requires that the criminal charges containing the 
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demand for forfeiture be personally served upon the defendant to the criminal 
action, in line with the requirement of the criminal procedure statutes requiring a 
copy of the Information or Indictment be given to the accused. Here, Appellant 
was indicted, not by the State of Utah, but by the United States, and no forfeiture 
action was part of the federal indictment. Conversely, no State criminal charges 
were filed against Appellant, and thus no demand for forfeiture was part of a 
criminal indictment or information against Appellant in which the State could 
pursue its claims of forfeiture. Thus no personal service was required as alleged 
now by Appellant. 
There being no criminal charges against Appellant in which to advance the 
forfeiture action against the defendant real property, notification through certified 
mail was sufficient notice for a forfeiture proceeding. The State filed civil 
proceedings against Appellant's real property, based upon its forfeitability under 
Utah law, because of the property's use and status in violation of the Utah 
Controlled Substance Act within Utah Code Ann. §58-37-13(2), which subjects 
property to forfeiture when property is found in proximity to forfeitable controlled 
substances, when property is used to conceal, store and manufacture controlled 
substances, and when the property is derived from proceeds traceable to an illegal 
controlled substance transaction or exchange in violation of the Utah Controlled 
Substances Act. See Utah Code Ann. §58-37-13(2) (Supp. 1996). 
The forfeiture provisions of the Utah Controlled Substances Act, §58-37-
13(9)(c), set forth the notice and service requirements necessary to proceed with a 
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forfeiture action instituted under Subsections (2)(a)-(k). Subsection (9)(d) sets 
forth the notice requirements for section (9)(c), which states that Notice of Seizure 
and Intended Forfeiture shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court, and served upon 
all persons known to have a claim in the property. Utah Code Ann. §58-37-
13(9)(d). Within (9)(d) are two subsections that categorize how notice is to be 
served upon interested persons of the property based on their differing 
circumstances. Utah Code Ann. §58-37-13(9)(d)(i) provides that notice is fulfilled 
by "personal service upon a claimant who is criminally charged in an information 
or indictment." In contrast, Utah Code Annotated §58-37-13(9)(d)(ii) provides 
that notice of forfeiture is fulfilled by "certified mail to each claimant whose name 
and address is known or to each owner whose right, title, or interest is of record in 
the Division of Motor Vehicles to the address given upon the records of the 
division, which service is considered complete even though mail is refused or 
cannot be forwarded." Based on the two separate clauses indicating the method of 
service for interested persons in different situations, the State properly notified the 
Appellant of the impending forfeiture by certified mail as he was an interested 
party but was not criminally charged by the State. 
In the present case, the Appellant contends that personal service was 
required because he had been criminally indicted prior to the notice of forfeiture. 
This is true, however, the State did not file criminal charges against the Appellant, 
rather he was federally indicted. Consequently, the State did not know of the 
federal indictment when this office began civil forfeiture proceedings against the 
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Appellant. Further, the legislative aims of the 1996 amendments could not be 
achieved, in that the State forfeiture action was not proceeding as part of a State 
criminal case, thus obviating the need, under the 1996 amendments, for personal 
service of the Information or Indictment against a criminal defendant where that 
Information or Indictment sought to combine the State's criminal charges and the 
State's forfeiture action into a single proceeding. It is impossible for the State to 
combine its forfeiture action into a federal indictment. Consequently, the State 
properly served the Appellant as mandated by Utah Code Ann. §58-37-
13(9)(d)(ii), which requires certified mail for persons who have an interest in the 
property. 
Furthermore, Appellant's contentions regarding proper notice for forfeiture 
of Utah Code Ann. §58-37-13 can be properly settled through statutory 
interpretation. "It is a fundamental rule of statutory interpretation . . . that a statute 
be looked at in its entirety and in accordance with the purpose which was sought 
to be accomplished." W.C.P. v. State, 974 P.2d 302 (Utah 1999). Thus, "when 
called upon to interpret a statute, ' [the] primary goal is to give effect to the 
legislature's intent in the light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve.'" 
Lieber v. ITT Hartford Insurance Center. Inc., 15 P.3d 1030, 1033 (Utah 
2000)(quoting Evans v. State, 963 P.2d 177, 184 (Utah 1998)). "The best 
evidence of the true intent and purpose of the legislature in enacting a statute is the 
plain language of the statute. 'We therefore look first to the statute's plain 
n 
language.5" Lieber v. ITT Hartford Insurance Center. Inc.. 15 P.3d 1030, 1033 
(Utah 2000)(quoting State V. Hunt. 906 P.2d 311, 312 (Utah 1995)). 
Based on the plain language and the entire structure of Utah Code Ann. 
§58-37-13, the statute clearly defines the property subject to forfeiture in section 
(2)(a) through (2)(k). Section (9) defines the procedural requirements for 
forfeiture proceedings. Subsection (9)(a) outlines the requirements for forfeiture 
actions based upon forfeitability under §58-37-13(2)(a)-(j). Subsection 9(b) 
outlines the procedures to be used where the forfeiture action is proceeding as part 
of a criminal information or indictment brought by the State against the claimant 
to the property. Subsection (9)(c) specifically outlines the procedures to be used 
in seeking forfeiture based on a filing under Subsection (2)(k). Subsection (9)(d) 
outlines the statute's notice requirements. Considering the flow and symmetry of 
the statute, it is apparent that Subsection (9)(d)'s notice requirements regarding 
personal service apply only to those situations where the forfeiture proceedings are 
combined with State criminal charges against the claimant for the same activities 
giving rise to the forfeiture action, as contemplated by Subsection 9(b). Therefore, 
it is logically apparent that notice requirements follow the commencement of 
forfeiture proceedings, thus Subsection 9(d)'s notice requirements apply to 
Subsection 9(a)-(c)'s forfeiture proceedings. 
Nevertheless, Appellant proffers Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure as the governing guide to notice procedures for this forfeiture statute. 
This reliance on a Rule promulgated by the Supreme Court overcoming the 
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requirements of the legislative statutory scheme is unwarranted and unnecessary 
when notice requirements for forfeiture are apparent and outlined within the 
forfeiture statute itself Consequently, Utah Code Ann. §58-37-13(9)(d) mandates 
the notice requirements for a forfeiture complaint based on filings under Utah 
Code Ann. §58-37-13(2)(a)-(k) and therefore should govern the notice 
requirements in this case. 
Lastly, the notice requirements in (9)(d) categorize methods by which to 
serve notice based on the circumstances of persons who have a claim to the 
property. As noted above, Utah Code Ann. §58-37-13(9)(d)(i) governs notice 
requirements to persons who have a claim to the forfeited property that have been 
charged by the State in a criminal information or indictment, where the forfeiture 
action is combined with and contained in the State criminal proceeding. If the 
forfeiture action is proceeding as part of a State criminal case against the 
interested person, then personal service is required. Alternatively, certified mail is 
required for notice to all other interested persons in the property. Utah Code Ann. 
§58-37-13(9)(d)(ii). At the time the State filed its Verified Complaint for 
Forfeiture in this matter, which began this civil proceeding, the State had neither 
filed criminal charges against the Appellant nor had the State sought an indictment 
against Appellant. Further, this forfeiture proceeding was not part of any criminal 
case brought by the State against Appellant. Consequently, based on the facts 
known to the State at the time of filing, the State notified the Appellant according 
to Subsection (9)(d)(ii) as he was a claimant to the forfeited property. The State 
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was only required to notify Appellant through certified mail, which was done. 
Thus, service of notice upon the Appellant was sufficient and proper. The Court's 
default judgment against Appellant's property should be upheld. 
POINT II: THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION 
TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Appellant's motion 
to set aside default judgment, because the court did not "mechanically adopt" the 
findings of fact and conclusions of law submitted by the Salt Lake County District 
Attorney's Office. Bover v. Lignell 567 P.2d 1112, 1113 (Utah 1977). "The law 
is well settled that it is the duty of the trial judge in contested cases to find facts 
upon all material issues submitted for decision unless findings are waived." Id. 
"The court may ask the prevailing counsel to submit findings to aid the court in 
the making these necessary findings. However, the court should not 
'mechanically adopt' these findings." Hoth v. White, 799 P.2d 213, 218 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990) (citations omitted). The trial court has the exclusive discretion to 
adopt the findings as submitted "in that court as long as the findings are not clearly 
contrary to the evidence." Bover v. Lignell 567 P.2d at 1114. 
On January 5, 2000, the State submitted proposed finding of fact and 
conclusions of law concerning the trial court's denial of the Appellant's motion to 
set aside judgment. These were adopted, signed and entered by the Court on 
January 11, 2000. On January 13, 2000, Appellant's counsel requested a hearing, 
filed a motion for reconsideration or in the alternative to make findings of fact and 
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conclusions of law, then filed an objection to the State's proposed findings of fact 
and conclusions of law. The Appellant's motions and objection were before the 
court for decision on March 8, 2000. The trial court denied Appellant's motions 
based upon the files and records of this case, including the pleadings submitted by 
the parties and the arguments of counsel. The trial court adopted the findings as 
submitted by the State. Similarly, the Supreme Court found in Boyer v. Lignell 
that the trial judge did not mechanically adopt the findings as prepared by the 
prevailing party, because "the proposed 'findings' were submitted by defendants' 
counsel, the plaintiff filed objections and proposed amendments which were 
argued before the trial court who ultimately adopted the findings as submitted." 
567 P.2d at 1113-14. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in this 
case, because the court did not mechanically adopt the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law as submitted by the State. 
Furthermore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by declaring a 
default judgment against the Appellant where the Appellant was not personally 
served. Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-13(9)(d)(ii) provides that notice of 
forfeiture is fulfilled by "certified mail to each claimant whose name and address 
is known or to each owner whose right, title, or interest is of record in the Division 
of Motor Vehicles to the address given upon the records of the division, which 
service is considered complete even though mail is refused or cannot be 
forwarded." As set forth under Point I, the State was not required to personally 
serve the Appellant because he was not charged with State criminal charges, rather 
is 
he was federally indicted. Consequently, the State could not proceed with a 
forfeiture action in a State criminal proceeding, which is the very situation for 
which the Legislature mandated the personal service requirements of §58-37-
13(9)(d)(i) in 1996. The Appellant, however, proffers Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure as the governing guide to notice procedures involving forfeitures. 
Appellant's reliance on Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is 
unwarranted and unnecessary when notice requirements for forfeiture are apparent 
and outlined within the forfeiture statute itself. Therefore, the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion by declaring a default judgment against the Appellant where 
the Appellant was not personally served. The State properly served the Appellant 
as mandated by Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-13(9)(d)(ii), which requires certified 
mail for persons who have an interest in the property, where that person is not 
being prosecuted by the State. 
POINT III: APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE JUDGMENT 
IS NON-MERITORIOUS AND DEFECTIVE. 
Appellant's Motion to Set Aside Judgment failed to make any answer, or 
otherwise show that he has a meritorious basis for his claims to the property 
forfeited in this action. As such, his motion to set aside judgment at the trial level 
was properly dismissed. Under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b), Appellant 
must not only show that the judgment was entered against him through excusable 
neglect (or any other reason specified in Subdivision (b)), but he must also show 
that his motion to set aside the judgment was timely, and that his proposed answer 
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contains a defense that is entitled to be tried. Erickson v. Schenkers Int'l 
Forwarders, Inc., 882 P.2d 1147 (Utah 1994). See also State ex rel Utah State 
Dep't. of Social Services v. Musselman, 667 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1983). Further, that 
meritorious defense must be raised in the pleadings to set aside judgment. Id. 
Appellant, through counsel, filed his motion to set aside judgment pursuant 
to Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b), alleging that he should be granted relief from the effects 
of the default judgment because he was not properly served. Assuming this Court 
determined that such a reason could justify Appellant's motion to set aside under 
Rule 60(b), Appellant still fails to enunciate or provide any fact or circumstance 
which gives him a legitimate claim to the seized and forfeited property. Indeed, 
despite having counsel in this matter since its inception, Appellant has failed to 
make any answer or pleading which contains or suggests a legitimate claim to the 
defendant lot of property. Therefore, Appellant's motion to set aside judgment 
was groundless and defective under Utah law and was properly denied. 
A. Appellant Failed To Answer Or A Make Claim. 
Appellant was appropriately served, and because of his own conduct, errors 
or mistakes, claims he did not receive actual notice of the forfeiture proceeding. 
The statute which controls asset forfeiture for controlled substance violations 
mandates that "any claimant or interest holder shall file with the court a verified 
answer to the complaint within 20 days after service." Utah Code Ann. §58-37-
13((9)(e). [Emphasis added]. Here, it has been over three years since service in 
this matter was made, and more than two and a half years since Appellant claims 
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he became aware of the judgment. Yet, there was never a verified answer filed 
with the court, or any enunciation within his various memoranda moving to set 
aside judgment as to how he could have a legitimate claim to the property. This 
failure on Appellant's part cannot now be overcome on appeal when the motion to 
set aside judgment was properly denied for failure to comply with Rule 60(b). 
B. The Seized Property Is Presumed To Be Forfeitable. 
Furthermore, the seized property contained an operable clandestine 
methamphetamine lab and distributable amounts of controlled substances. Utah 
law presumes that all property located in the proximity of controlled substances is 
forfeitable. Here, all statutory interest holders or owners of the seized property 
failed to answer and have been defaulted. Thus, the Court should accept these 
presumptions as fact in this case. Again, Appellant failed to raise any meritorious 
claims or defenses, and failed to allege any purported answer which addresses or 
rebuts the presumption at the trial court level. Therefore, having no statutory 
claims of his own, Appellant cannot have met the necessary burden to set aside the 
default judgment in this case. 
C. The Appellant Makes No Meritorious Claims To The Property 
Before a default judgment can be set aside, the moving party must have 
established a meritorious defense to the action, and that meritorious defense to the 
action must be raised in the pleadings seeking to set aside the default judgment. 
State ex rel Utah State Dep't. of Social Services v. Musselman, 667 P.2d 1053 
(Utah 1983). Here, Appellant's pleadings seeking to set aside the default in this 
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matter are singularly devoid of any allegation or fact which would defeat the 
State's claim or the presumptions of the statutes. Further, Appellant raises not a 
single defense, either meritorious or frivolous, in his pleadings. It seems as though 
the sum of Appellant's motion for relief from judgment amounts to "I avoided 
notice of these proceedings when they were mailed to me and attempted to be 
delivered to my actual residence by the Postal Service, I have no reasons why the 
property should be forfeited, but set aside the judgment anyway." This cannot be 
allowed by this Court, and must not be condoned as a method or reason to upset 
the valid judgments of a court. The only person to whom Appellant can look for 
fault is himself, as he avoided the certified mail which would have given him 
notice of these proceedings. This Court cannot grant Appellant the relief he seeks, 
as he has advanced, raised or alleged no meritorious defense to the action as 
required by Musselman. State ex rel Utah State Dep't. of Social Services v. 
Musselman, 667 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1983) 
POINT IV: THE TRIAL COURT WAS NOT REQUIRED TO 
MAKE FINDINGS OF FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW CONCERNING THE EXCESSIVE FINES 
CLAUSE. 
Appellant's argument that the trial court's failure to make findings of facts 
and conclusions of law at the default judgment violates the Eight Amendment of 
the United States and Article I, Section 9 of the Utah State Constitution fails. In 
support of that argument, the Appellant relies upon the Utah Supreme Court 
decision, State v. Real Property at 633 East 640 North, Orem, Utah. 994 P.2d 1254 
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(Utah 2000). However, such reliance is flawed due the fact that the above 
argument was not made at the lower court level. "Under ordinary circumstances, 
appellate courts will not consider an issue, including a constitutional argument, 
raised for the first time on appeal unless the trial court committed plain error." 
State v. Helmick. 9 P.3d 164 (Utah 2000); Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d 1017, 1022 
(Utah 1996) (holding issues not raised at trial level can not be argued for the first 
time on appeal); Hart v. Salt Lake County Comm'n, 945 P.2d 125, 130 (Utah 
Ct.App.1997) (holding appellate court lacks jurisdiction if party does not preserve 
claim by first raising it before trial court). Therefore, if the court did not commit 
plain error, this court cannot reach Appellant's excessive fines argument. 
Even if the trial court committed plain error, Appellant's argument still 
fails. Appellant's appellate attack on the default judgment fails to comply with 
Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. The rule states: 
In a case in which an appeal is permitted as a matter of right from 
the trial court to the appellate court, the notice of appeal required 
by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 30 
days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed 
from. 
Utah R. App. P. 4(a). The trial court entered the default judgment on August 11, 
1997. (R. 11). The Appellant filed a notice of appeal on September 18, 2000. 
From those dates alone it can be concluded that Appellant's opportunity to appeal 
the default judgment is past due. As such, Appellant's appellate attack on the 
default judgment itself is barred and should be denied. 
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In addition, the Appellant cannot bootstrap the excessive fines argument on 
to the present appeal concerning the trial court's denial of Appellant's motion to 
set aside the judgment under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b). Appellant's 
argument on excessive fines is not within the scope of an appeal from Rule 60(b). 
The Utah Court of Appeals states: 
[E]ven when an order on a Rule 60(b) motion is appealable, the 
appeal is narrow in scope. An appeal of a Rule 60(b) order 
addresses only the propriety of the denial or grant of relief. The 
appeal does not, at least in most cases, reach the merits of the 
underlying judgment from which relief was sought. Appellate 
review of Rule 60(b) orders must be narrowed in this manner lest 
Rule 60(b) become a substitute for timely appeals. An inquiry 
into the merits of the underlying judgment or order must be the 
subject of a direct appeal from that judgment or order. 
Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. v. Melvin, 2 P.3d 451 (Utah Ct. App. 
2000)(citations omitted). Therefore, the Appellant cannot use an appeal on a Rule 
60(b) motion as a means to launch a collateral attack on the default judgment 
when a direct appeal would be barred for timeliness. As such, Appellant's 
excessive fine argument fails and should therefore be denied. 
CONCLUSION 
The State respectfully requests that the default judgment be summarily 
affirmed. In addition, the State requests that the denial of Appellant's motion to 
set aside the judgment and the motion to reconsider the motions to set aside the 
judgment should be affirmed. The evidence and relevant law as applied to that 
evidence demonstrates that Appellant's right to notice was not violated. 
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For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that the trial 
court's denial of the Appellant's motion to set aside the judgment be affirmed and 
that the Appellant's default judgment be affirmed. 
Dated this 2^day of June, 2001. 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
District Attorney of Salt Lake County 
-Zj^sr^ 
A.HAI 
CHAD L. PLATT 
Deputy District Attorneys 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/DELIVERY 
I, Clark A. Harms, hereby certify that I have caused to be hand-
delivered/mailed, first class postage pre-paid, two true and correct copies of the 
foregoing to Steven B. Wall, WALL & WALL, 5200 South Highland Drive, Suite 
300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84117, thisJ2/day of June, 2001. 
CLARK HARMS 
Deputy District Attorney 
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ADDENDUM 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
AMENDMEN' ~TTI 
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessi\ e fines imposed, i IC i en lei and 
unusual punishments inflicted. 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
ARTICLE 1 > 
Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines shall not be imposed; nor 
shall cruel and unusual punishments be inflicted. Persons arrested or imprisoned 
shall not be treated with unnecessary rigor. 
ARTICLE VII. §5 
(1) The executive power of the state shall \K *^ r . tnl m Hlir i u n a n m ^ lm '.lull -.iv 
that the laws are faithfully executed. 
(2) The Governor shall transact all executive business with the officers of the 
government, civil and military, and may require information in writing from the 
officers of the Executive Department, and from the officers and managers of state 
institutions upon any subject relating to the condition, management, and expenses 
of their respective offices and institutions. The Governor may at any time when 
the Legislature is not in session, if deemed necessary, appoint a committee to 
investigate and report to the Governor upon the condition of any executive office 
or state institution. 
(3) The Governor shall communicate by message the condition of the state to the 
Legislature at every annual general session and recommend such measures as may 
be deemed expedient. 
(4) The Governor may appoint legal counsel to ad1 i :;•;;* Governor, 
UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 
RULE 3. APPEAL AS OF RIGHT: HOW TAKEN. 
(a) Filing appeal from final orders and judgments. An appeal may be taken from a 
district or juvenile court to the appellate court with jurisdiction over the appeal 
from all final orders and judgments, except as otherwise provided by law, by filing 
a notice of appeal with the clerk of the trial court within the time allowed by Rule 
4. Failure of an appellant to take any step other than the timely filing of a notice of 
appeal does not affect the validity of the appeal, but is ground only for such action 
as the appellate court deems appropriate, which may include dismissal of the 
appeal or other sanctions short of dismissal, as well as the award of attorney fees. 
RULE 4. APPEAL AS OF RIGHT: WHEN TAKEN. 
(a) Appeal from final judgment and order. In a case in which an appeal is 
permitted as a matter of right from the trial court to the appellate court, the notice 
of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 
30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from. However, 
when a judgment or order is entered in a statutory forcible entry or unlawful 
detainer action, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk 
of the trial court within 10 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order 
appealed from. 
(b) Motions post judgment or order. If a timely motion under the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure is filed in the trial court by any party (1) for judgment under Rule 
50(b); (2) under Rule 52(b) to amend or make additional findings of fact, whether 
or not an alteration of the judgment would be required if the motion is granted; (3) 
under Rule 59 to alter or amend the judgment; or (4) under Rule 59 for a new trial, 
the time for appeal for all parties shall run from the entry of the order denying a 
new trial or granting or denying any other such motion. Similarly, if a timely 
motion under the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure is filed in the trial court under 
Rule 24 for a new trial, the time for appeal for all parties shall run from the entry 
of the order denying a new trial. A notice of appeal filed before the disposition of 
any of the above motions shall have no effect. A new notice of appeal must be 
filed within the prescribed time measured from the entry of the order of the trial 
court disposing of the motion as provided above. 
UTAH RULES Ut CIVIL PROCEDURE 
RULE 60. RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT OR ORDER 
(b) Mistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable Neglect; Newly Discovered Evidence; 
Fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the 
furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final 
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which 
by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial 
under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or 
extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the 
judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a 
prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it 
is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or 
(6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The 
motion shall be made within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), or (3), not 
more than 3 months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. 
A motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or 
suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an 
independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to 
set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for obtaining any 
relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an 
independent action. 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953 
(. i he ioiiowmg are suojeci to ioneiture and no property right exists in them: 
(a) all controlled substances which have been manufactured, distributed, 
dispensed, or acquired in violation of this chapter; 
(b) all raw materials, products, and equipment of any kind used, or intended 
for use, in manufacturing, compounding, processing, delivering, importing, 
or exporting any controlled substance in violation of this chapter; 
(c) all property used or intended for use as a container for property 
described in Subsections (2)(a) and (2)(b); 
(d) all hypodermic needles, syringes, and other paraphernalia, not including 
capsules used with health food supplements and herbs, used or intended for 
use to administer controlled substances in violation of this chapter; 
(e) all conveyances including aircraft, vehicles, or vessels used or intended 
for use, to transport, or in any manner facilitate the transportation, sale, 
receipt, simple possession, or concealment of property described in 
Subsections (2)(a) and (2)(b), except that: 
(i) a conveyance used by any person as a common carrier in the 
transaction of business as a common carrier may not be forfeited 
under this section unless the owner or other person in charge of the 
conveyance was a consenting party or knew or had reason to know 
of the violation of this chapter; 
(ii) a conveyance may not be forfeited under this section by reason 
of any act or omission committed or omitted without the ownerfs 
knowledge or consent; and 
(iii) any forfeiture of a conveyance is subject to the claim of an 
interest holder who did not know or have reason to know after the 
exercise of reasonable diligence that a violation would or did take 
place in the use of the conveyance; 
(f) all books, records, and research, including formulas, microfilm, tapes, 
and data used or intended for use in violation of this chapter; 
(g) everything of value furnished or intended to be furnished in exchange 
for a controlled substance in violation of this chapter, and all moneys, 
negotiable instruments, and securities used or intended to be used to 
facilitate any violation of this chapter. An interest in property may not be 
forfeited under this subsection unless it is proven by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the interest holder knew, had reason to know of, or consented 
to the conduct which made the property subject to forfeiture. The burden of 
presenting this evidence shall be upon the state; 
(h) all imitation controlled substances as defined in Section 58-37b-2, 
Imitation Controlled Substances Act; 
(i) all warehousing, housing, and storage facilities, or interest in real 
property of any kind used, or intended for use, in producing, cultivating, 
warehousing, storing, protecting, or manufacturing any controlled 
substances in violation of this chapter, except that: 
(i) any forfeiture of a housing, warehousing, or storage facility or 
interest in real property is subject to the claim of an interest holder 
who did not know or have reason to know after the exercise of 
reasonable diligence that a violation would take place on the 
property; 
(ii) an interest in property may not be forfeited under this subsection 
if the interest holder did not know or have reason to know of the 
conduct which made the property subject to forfeiture, or did not 
willingly consent to the conduct; and 
(iii) unless the premises are used in producing, cultivating, or 
manufacturing controlled substances, a housing, warehousing, or 
storage facility or interest in real property may not be forfeited under 
this subsection unless cumulative sales of controlled substances on 
the property within a two-month period total or exceed $1,000, or 
the street value of any controlled substances found on the premises 
at any given time totals or exceeds $1,000. A narcotics officer 
experienced in controlled substances law enforcement may testify to 
establish the street value of the controlled substances for purposes of 
this subsection; 
(j) any firearm, weapon, or ammunition carried or used during or in relation 
to a violation of this chapter or any firearm, weapon, or ammunition kept or 
located within the proximity of controlled substances or other property 
subject to forfeiture under this section; and 
(k) all proceeds traceable to any violation of this chapter. There is a 
rebuttable presumption that all money, coins, and currency found in 
proximity to forfeitable controlled substances, drug manufacturing 
equipment or supplies, drug distributing paraphernalia, or forfeitable 
records of importation, manufacture, or distribution of controlled 
substances are proceeds traceable to a violation of this chapter. The burr 
of proof is upon the claimant of the property to rebut this presumption. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-13(9) 
(9) Forfeiture proceedings shall be commenced as follows: 
(a) For actions brought under Subsections (2)(a) through (2)(j), a complaint 
shall be prepared by the county attorney, or if within a prosecution district, 
the district attorney, or the attorney general, and 
filed in a court of record where the property was seized or is to be seized. In 
cases in which the claimant of the property is also charged as a criminal 
defendant, the complaint shall be filed in the county where the criminal 
charges arose, regardless of the location of the property, The complaint 
shall include: 
(i) a description of the property which is SUDJC. ,, ! 
(ii) the date and place of seizure, if known; and 
(iii) the allegations of conduct which gives rise to forfeiture. 
(b) In cases where a claimant is also charged as a criminal defendant, the 
forfeiture shall proceed as part of the criminal prosecution as an in 
personam action against the defendant's interest in the property subject to 
forfeiture. A defendant need not file a written answer to the complaint, but 
may acknowledge or deny interest in the property at the time of first 
appearance on the criminal charges. If a criminal information or indictment 
is amended to include a demand for forfeiture, the defendant may respond 
to the demand at the time of the amendment 
(i) Unless motion for disposition is made by the defendant, the 
determination of forfeiture shall be stayed until resolution of the 
criminal charges. Hearing on the forfeiture shall be before the court 
without a jury. The court may consider any evidence presented in the 
criminal case, and receive any other evidence offered by the state or 
the defendant. The court shall determine by a preponderance of the 
evidence the issues in the case and order forfeiture or release of the 
property as it determines. 
(ii) A defendant may move the court to transfer the forfeiture action, 
to stay all action, including discovery, in the forfeiture, or for 
hearing on the forfeiture any time prior to trial of the criminal 
charges. Either party may move the court to enter a finding of 
forfeiture as to defendant's interest in part or all of the property, 
either by default or by stipulation. Upon entry of a finding, the court 
shall stay the entry of judgment until resolution of the criminal 
charges. Any finding of forfeiture entered by the court prior to 
resolution of the criminal charges may not constitute a separate 
judgment, and any motion for disposition, stay, severance, or 
transfer of the forfeiture action may not create a separate proceeding. 
Upon the granting of a motion by the defendant for disposition, stay, 
severance, or transfer of the forfeiture action, the defendant shall be 
considered to have waived any claim that the defendant has been 
twice put in jeopardy for the same offense, 
(iii) Any other person claiming an interest in property subject to 
forfeiture under this subsection may not intervene in a trial or appeal 
of 
a complaint filed under this subsection. Following the entry of an in 
personam forfeiture order, or upon the filing of a petition for release 
under Subsection (e), the county attorney, district attorney, or 
attorney general may proceed with a separate in rem action to 
resolve any other claims upon the property subject to forfeiture, 
(c) A complaint seeking forfeiture under Subsection (2)(k) shall be 
prepared by the county attorney, or if within a prosecution district, the 
district attorney, or by the attorney general, either in personam as part of a 
criminal prosecution, or in a separate civil in rem action against the 
property alleged to be proceeds, and filed in the county where the property 
is seized or encumbered, if the proceeds are located outside the state. A 
finding that property is the proceeds of a violation of this chapter does not 
require proof that the property is the proceeds of any particular exchange or 
transaction. Proof that property is proceeds may be shown by evidence 
which establishes all of the following by a preponderance of the evidence: 
(i) that the person has engaged in conduct in violation of this 
chapter; 
(ii) that the property was acquired by the person during that period 
when the conduct in violation of this chapter occurred or within a 
reasonable time after that period; and 
(iii) that there was no likely source for the property other than 
conduct in 
violation of the chapter. 
(d) Notice of the seizure and intended forfeiture shall be filed with the clerk 
of the court, and served upon all persons known to the county attorney or 
district attorney to have a claim in the property by: 
(i) personal service upon a claimant who is charged in a criminal 
information or indictment; and 
(ii) certified mail to each claimant whose name and address is known 
or to each owner whose right, title, or interest is of record in the 
Division of Motor Vehicles to the address given upon the records of 
the division, which service is considered complete even though the 
mail is refused or cannot be forwarded. The county attorney, district 
attorney, or attorney general shall make one publication in a 
newspaper of general circulation in the county where the seizure was 
made for all other claimants whose addresses are unknown, but who 
are believed to have an interest in the property. 
(e) Except under Subsection (9)(a) in personam actions, any claimant or 
interest holder shall file with the court a verified answer to the complaint 
within 20 days after service. When property is seized under this chapter, 
any interest holder or claimant of the property, prior to being served with a 
complaint under this section, may file a petition in the court having 
jurisdiction for release of his interest in the property. The petition shall 
specify the claimant's interest in the property and his right to have it 
released. A copy shall be served upon the county attorney or, if within a 
prosecution district, the district attorney in the county of the seizure, who 
shall answer the petition within 20 days. A petitioner need not answer a 
complaint of forfeiture. 
UTAH CODE ANN. §78-2a-3(2). 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction u. mding jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(j) cases transferred to the Coun ui APP-. als from the Supreme Coui t. 
